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ENAYAT THEORIES
ALBERT VISSER
Abstract. In this paper we study solution attempts for a problem posed by
Ali Enayat: can there be a finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory
that interprets itself plus the (sentential or non-uniform) Tarski biconditionals?
We provide a basic framework for the study of this question and discuss some
solution attempts. We connect the question with some interesting conjectures.
We briefly touch upon what happens if we consider uniform biconditionals.
1. Introduction: Ali Enayat asks a question
On January 24, 2014, Ali Enayat sent me an e-mail with subject ‘a simple (?!)
question’. The content of the mail was as follows.
Suppose B is a finitely axiomatizable base theory , and BT is B plus the T-
scheme, i.e., biconditionals of the form: S iff T(#S), where #S is the code for
S. Question: Is BT interpretable in B?
I thought that I would be able to solve the problem, for the most salient case where
the base theory is sequential, within a day’s time, but I was sadly mistaken. The
problem is still unsolved for the sequential case and even for the more inclusive
Vaught case. I give a positive example of a non-Vaught theory that interprets itself
plus Tarski biconditionals in Section 4. Admittedly, this example involves a not
quite standard Go¨del numbering.
Let us say that a theory U that interprets U plus the Tarski biconditionals for the
language of U is an Enayat theory.1 Ali’s question suggests the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1.1. There are no consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential Enayat
theories. ❍
The argument in favor of the conjecture is simply the rhetorical question: what
could such an interpretation possibly look like?
Why publish my failed attempts? I think there are some good reasons to do
that.
• It is good to make people aware of the problem. It is a basic and intricate
problem from the logico-technical standpoint. I think the related problems
concerning the meta-mathematics of first-order theories formulated in this
paper illustrate that our problem leads to interesting further questions.
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1As explained in Section 3, it is somewhat more subtle to get the question right. The notion
of Enayat theory tout court only makes sense is the case one considers Vaught theories.
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Also, the problem fits, at the lower end, in the broader logico-philosophical
program of research into truth theories. It is, in a sense, about the infor-
mativeness of the minimal typed truth theory.
Along a different line, I think it is time logicians would look a bit more
at sentential schemes (in some broad sense). These often behave differently
from their uniform brethren. The primary example of a sentential scheme
is parameter-free induction. See, e.g., [KPD88], [Bek96] and [CFL11]. For
a sllightly different, but related, study, see [Vis14a].
• The paper provides the basic framework for the study of Ali’s question. It
is good to have these things out of the way.
• If a reader would want to try her hand on the problem, the attempts con-
tained in the paper would at least spare her the time to rediscover those.
• In Section 7, we develop Saccheri style what an ‘Enayat world’ would look
like. This provides some further basics that can play a role in a solution.
• In the study of this problem, errors are everywhere dense. Especially, one
has to keep the dependencies of the complexities of the various items in-
volved in an argument straight. (I often had the illusion of having solved
the problem for days, but then a subtle circularity of dependencies turned
up.) The paper provides, I hope, an example of good practice in keeping
track of dependencies.
• I feel some of the arguments in the paper are definitely entertaining. A
good example is the proof of Theorem 8.8.
In Section 5, we have a brief look at what happens when we consider uniform
biconditionals. In a subsequent paper, I hope to give a fuller picture.
2. Basics
In this section, we provide the basic framework for the study of Enayat theories.
2.1. Theories, translations and interpretations. Theories are, in our paper,
theories of first order predicate logic of finite signature that are given by a suffi-
ciently simple set of axioms, say ∆b1. In the few cases where we diverge from this
format it will be explcitly mentioned. The axiom set is part of the data of a theory.
We refer the reader for a discussion of translations and interpretations to one
of our papers [Vis13] or [Vis17] or [Vis18b] or [Vis18a]. Here we just fix some
notations.
• We write U  V for U interprets V .
• We write ΓU ∆ for Γ interprets ∆ over U , i.o.w., (U +Γ) (U +∆). Here
Γ and ∆ will be, in the typical case, sets of sentences, each with a signature
that is an extension of the signature of U .
• We write Γ ◮U ∆ for Γ Fujimoto interprets ∆ over U . This means that we
have an identity-preserving, unrelativised interpretation of U +∆ in U +Γ
that preserves the vocubulary of U . Here Γ and ∆ have signatures that
extend the signature of U .
• loc stands for local interpretability and dir stands for direct interpretabil-
ity. Direct interpretability is unrelativized and identity preserving inter-
pretability. We allow more-dimensional direct interpretability.
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• We use ⊲⊳ for mutual interpretability and ◮◭ for mutual Fujimoto inter-
pretability.2
Some knowledge of the book [HP93] is definitely useful.
2.2. Vaughtness and sequentiality. In this subsection we define Vaught theo-
ries and sequential theories. We refer the reader to [Vis08] and [Vis13] for more
information.
2.2.1. Vaught Set Theory. We define Vaught set theory, VS as follows.
VS1. ∃x∀y y 6∈ x,
VS2. ∀u0 . . . ∀un−1 ∃x∀y (y ∈ x↔
∨
i<n y = ui).
We note that, under the right conventions, VS1 is the special case for n = 0 of VS2.
We also note that we do not have extensionality.
We can define Kuratowski pairing in the usual way. Of course, our pairs will
not be extensional and the same pair could be implemented by many entities. We
define a function as follows:
• f is a function iff ∀u ∈ f ∀v ∈ f (pair(u)∧ pair(v)∧ ((u)0 = (v)0 → u = v)).
We do not just demand the uniqueness of the output but also the uniqueness of the
pair that implements a transition. We define f : x ∼ y iff f is a bijection between
x and y, and x ∼ y iff ∃f f : x ∼ y.
We define VS+ as VS plus the axioms saying that ∼ is an equivalence relation
and that if f : x ∼ y, then x ∼ f .
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. VS dir VS
+. Moreover, the relevant interpretation is one-dimen-
sional.
We give the proof in Appendix A. Let R be the very weak arithmetical theory given
formulated by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson in their classic [TMR53]. We have:
Theorem 2.2. VS R. Moreover, the relevant interpretation is one-dimensional.
We give the proof in Appendix A.
A theory U is a Vaught theory if U dir VS. A theory U is a Vaught
+ theory
if U dir VS
+. In these definitions, we allow the direct interpretation to be more-
dimensional.
Theorem 2.1 tells us that a Vaught theory is ipso facto a Vaught+ theory.
2.2.2. Adjunctive Set Theory. We define adjunctive set theory, AS, as follows:
AS1. ∃x∀y y 6∈ x,
AS2. ∀u ∀v ∃x∀y (y ∈ x↔ (y ∈ u ∨ y = v)).
A theory U is sequential if U dir AS. Here we allow the direct interpretation to be
more dimensional.3 Sequentiality is well studied: we refer the reader to [Vis13] for
an extensive discussion of the notion.
2In my earlier papers, I use ≡ for mutual interpretability. However, Lev Beklemishev uses this
symbol for other notions of sameness of theories. I think the present notation will eliminate all
ambiguity.
3Thus, our notion of sequentiality is an extension of the usual one. In [Vis13], I called this
notion polysequentiality. However, in the light of the facts that (i) we are just looking at a minor
extension of the notion and (ii) the modified notion is clearly the right one, it is high time to
redefine the traditional notion.
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We present some basic facts concerning sequential theories. We define (for any
theory U):
• 0(U) := S12 + { U,n⊤ | n ∈ ω}.
• A theory U is reflexive if U  0(U).
Here the U,n⊤ are restricted consistency statements for U , where of course U is
given by a fixed representation of the axioms and the restriction in both a restriction
of the size of the codes of the axioms and of the complexity of the formulas allowed
in the proofs. The measure of complexity here is depth of quantifier alternations.
See, e.g., [Vis11] or [Vis18a].
Here are some basic facts.
1. 0(U) U (this holds for any U).
2. If U is sequential, then U loc0(U). I.o.w., sequential theories are locally reflex-
ive.
3. If U is reflexive, then U loc V implies U  V .
4. Suppose U is sequential and, for all V , we have U loc V implies U  V . Then,
U is reflexive.
5. Finitely axiomatized sequential theories are not reflexive. (See [Pud85].)
3. Basic definitions and insights
In this section we give a precise definition of Ali’s question. My main interest
is in Ali’s question for sequential theories. However, it is good to have a wider
definition. Setting things up with a bit more generality will enable us to apply
some informal rigour to the choice of notions. We will see that already for Vaught
theories, Ali’s question makes good sense.
We consider broader and narrower versions of the question. We will show that
the question takes its most natural form in the sequential case.
3.1. Basic formulation of the question. We first address the treatment of nu-
merals. What is needed here is that the theories we consider interpret at least
some minimal theory successor. For this we choose the theory Succ0. The the-
ory Succ0 has one constant 0 and one binary predicate S. I will use infix nota-
tion for S. The axioms of Succ0 are as follows. We define 0˜(x) := (x = 0) and
˜(n+ 1)(x) := ∃y (n˜(y) ∧ y S x).
Succ01. ∃x n˜(x)
Succ02. ¬ (m˜(x) ∧ n˜(x)), where m < n
Succ03. (n˜(x) ∧ n˜(y))→ x = y
So, the theory just says that successor behaves normally as long as we are finitely
far removed from 0. We have the following small insight.
Theorem 3.1. Succ0 is a sub-theory of R, where we identify x S y with Sx = y.
Consider any theory U and suppose N : Succ0 → U . Suppose N is n-ary. We
expand the signature of U with a new n-ary predicate T. We write T(n) for:
∃~x ∈ δN (n˜
N (~x) ∧ T(~x)).
(In case we want to emphasize the dependence of our numerals on N we write
T(nN ).)
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The class of sentential Tarski biconditionals TB−N consists of the sentences of the
form A↔ T(pAq). Here A is a U -sentence and pAq is the Go¨del number of A. We
will usually omit the underlining and simply write T(pAq).
We say that N has the Enayat Property or that U is an N -Enayat theory iff
U  (U + TB−N ), or, i.o.w., ⊤U TB
−
N .
We note that N is part of the data for n and U is part of the data for N
and the signature of U is part of the data for U . So, indeed, the notation ‘TB−N ’
exhibits all the necessary data, with the exception of the Go¨del numbering, to
construct the intended set of sentences. In most of the paper, we will treat the Go¨del
numbering as fixed in the back-ground, where the Go¨del numbering is supposed
to be a standard efficient Go¨del numbering. Exceptions are Subsection 3.3 and
Section 4. In Subsection 4, we need a non-standard numbering. In Subsection 3.3,
we show that, in the Vaught case, the Enayat property does not depend on the
Go¨del numbering under the appropriate assumptions of Go¨del numberings.
Remark 3.2. We note that, even if our framework is fairly general, the theory
Succ0 may be still too restrictive. The point is that nothing really seems to depend
on the uniqueness of the numerals as stipulated in Succ03. The only advantage of
the present approach is that we can use the numeral notation in a meaningful way.
One important advantage of the more general approach, where we drop Succ03, is
that also pair theories are covered by the framework. ❍
Here is a first small observation. This observation is well-known. I do not know
who first made it.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose N : U  Succ0. Then, ⊤ ◮loc,U TB
−
N .
Proof. We interpret the axioms A0 ↔ T(pA0q), . . . , An−1 ↔ T(pAn−1q), by defin-
ing: T(~x) :↔
∨
k<n(p˜Akq(~x) ∧ Ak). ❑
3.2. Intensionality. Enayatness, as defined here, is an intensional property, since,
in the general case, it critically depends both on N and on the choice of the Go¨del
numbering. In Section 4, we will see an example that illustrates these dependencies.
We will see that, in the case that U is a Vaught theory, Enayatness is independent
of the Go¨del numbering, assuming that all Go¨del numberings that we allow are
recursively related to some standard Go¨del numbering. Secondly, we will see that,
for Vaught theories, Enayatness can be considered as a property of theories rather
than of interpretations.
In the case of sequential theories, we can even do better: we can give a charac-
terization of Enayatness in which Go¨del numerings nor truth are mentioned!
3.3. Enayatness for Vaught theories. We show that, for Vaught theories, the
property of Enayatness is independent of the choice of numerals. Moreover, we
show that, for Vaught theories, Enayatness is independent of the choice of the Go¨del
numbering, as long as the Go¨del numberings considered are recursively related to
a standard one.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 3.4. Suppose U is a Vaught theory and N,M : Succ0  U . Then,
TB−N ◮◭U TB
−
M . It follows that M has the Enayat Property iff N does.
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Proof. We use a minor adaptation of a well-known argument due to Dedekind and
Pudla´k. See [Pud85].
We define F := FN,M beween δN and δM as follows. ~x F ~y iff there a partial
bijection f between δN and δM such that (i) f0N = f0M , (ii) if ~x SN ~y and f~y
is defined, then f~x is defined and f~x SM f~y. The definition of partial bijection is
provided via the direct interpretation of VS in U .
One now easily shows that
F(nN ) =M n
M and ∀~y ((δM (~y) ∧ F(n
N ) =M ~y)→ ~y =M n
M ).
We interpret U+TB−M via the translation, say τ , in U+TB
−
N by taking the identical
translation for the U -vocabulary and setting
Tτ (~y) := ∃~x (δN (~x) ∧ ~x F ~y ∧ T(~y)).
The interpretation of U + TB−N in U + TB
−
M is similar. ❑
We have found that, if a Vaught theory has the Enayat property for some N , it
has the Enayat property for all N . If a Vaught theory has the Enayat property for
some N , we will call it simply an Enayat theory.
Here is a convenient observation.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose U is a Vaught theory. Then U is Enayat iff U interprets
U + TB−N , for some N : R  U . Here the dimension of N can be taken to be the
dimension of the direct interpretation that establishes Vaughtness.
Proof. Consider a Vaught theory U . By Theorem 2.2, U interprets R, say, via N ,
where N is the composition of the one-dimensional interpretation of R in VS and
the direct interpretation of VS in U . It follows that the dimension of N is the
dimension of this direct interpretation.
Since R extends Succ0, by Theorem 3.1, U interprets Succ0 via the interpretation
N ′ based on τN . Clearly, U +TB
−
N is extensionally the same as U + TB
−
N ′ . So, we
are immediately done. ❑
When considering Vaught theories, we will from now on consider interpretations of
R.
We address the worry that Enayatness for Vaught theories may be crucially
dependent on details of the chosen Go¨del numbering.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose we have Go¨del numberings ν0 and ν1. We only need to
assume that the νi assign numbers to sentences. Suppose for some recursive function
η we have ν0 = η ◦ ν1. Suppose N : R→ U . Then, TB
−ν0
N ◮U TB
−ν0
N .
It follows that if U is a Vaught theory that is Enayat for ν0, then U is Enayat
for ν1.
Proof. We assume the conditions of the theorem. In R, we can represent the func-
tion η by a formula H . We now define a Fujimoto translation τ as follows.
Tτ (~x) := δN (~x) ∧ ∃~y ∈ δN (H
N (~x, ~y ) ∧ T0(~y )).
It is easy to see that τ delivers the goods. ❑
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We note that we need not impose any a priori restriction on the complexity of ν1
for the theorem to work. Of course, our default assumption is that we are working
with a reasonable Go¨del numbering.
Here is the general form of our conjecture for Vaught theories.
Conjecture 3.7. No finitely axiomatized consistent Vaught theory is Enayat. ❍
We also can ask a more modest question.
Open Question 3.8. Suppose there is a finitely axiomatized, consistent Vaught
theory that is Enayat. Can we show, under that assumption, that all finitely
axiomatized, consistent, Vaught theories are Enayat theories? ❍
We end this subsection with one further question.
Open Question 3.9. In Subsection 3.4, we will show that in the recursively enu-
merable sequential case, we can characterize Enayat theories in a coordinate-free
way. Not only is the question of Enayatness independent of the Go¨del number-
ing, but Go¨del numberings are not mentioned in the characterization. Can we do
something similar in the Vaught case? ❍
3.4. Enayatness for sequential theories. In case our theories are sequential and
recursively enumerable, we can do better than the previous section by eliminating
any reference to numerals and coding from the definition of Enayat theory.
We start with a convenient observation.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose U is a sequential. Then U is Enayat iff U  (U + TB−N )
for some N : S12  U . We can take the dimension of N to be the dimension of the
direct interpretation of AS in U that establishes sequentiality.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.5, noting that
sequential theories are Vaught and that S12 extends R and that the interpretation
of S12 in AS is one-dimensional. ❑
We say that an interpretation K : U  V is sententially restricted if, there is an n,
such that, for all U -sentences B, there is a V -sentence C, such that ρ(C) ≤ n and
V ⊢ BK ↔ C. Here ρ is the complexity measure depth-of-quantifier-alternations.
See [Vis18b] for a careful treatment of the measure.
Suppose N : S12  V . We say that an interpretation K : U  V is strongly
sententially restricted w.r.t. N iff, for some V -formula A(~x ), where the length of ~x
is the dimension of N , we have that, for all U -sentences B, V ⊢ BK ↔ A(pBqN ).
Theorem 3.11. Suppose K : UV , where V is sequential and recursively enumer-
able. Let N : S12V . Then, K is sententially restricted iff K is strongly sententially
restricted (w.r.t. N).
Proof. The right-to-left direction is immediate, noting that numerals only con-
tribute a constant to the complexity independent of the size of the numeral.
We treat left-to-right. Suppose K : U  V is sententially restricted. Let the
witnessing number be n. Let γ be the the function that takes as input a U -sentence
B, searches for the smallest (coded) V -proof with conclusion of the form BK ↔ C,
where ρ(C) ≤ n, and gives as output C. Clearly γ is a total recursive function.
Let Truen(~x) be a truth-predicate for V -sentences of complexity ≤ n based on
a satisfaction predicate Satn(~s, ~x) where we can prove the commutation clauses for
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formulas of complexity ≤ n that are in a suitable V -provable cut J of N . The
length of the sequence ~x is the dimension of N . We note that, since standard
numbers are in J , we have the Tarski biconditionals for Truen for sentences of the
right complexity. See [Vis18b] for a detailed treatment of partial truth predicates
in sequential theories.
We define A(~x) := Truen(G
N (~x)), where G stands for the representation in the
arithmetical language of the recursive function γ. Note that we really should have
written ∃~y ∈ δN (G
N (~x, ~y) ∧ Truen(~y)).
Consider any U -sentence B. Suppose γ(B) = C. We have:
V ⊢ A(pBq) ↔ Truen(G
N (pBq))
↔ Truen(pCq)
↔ C
↔ BK ❑
We now have immediately the following consequence.
Theorem 3.12. Let V be sequential. Then, V is an Enayat theory iff V has a
sententially restricted self-interpretation.
We note that, for decidable theories, the identity interpretation is restricted. So,
having a restricted self-interpretation generally is much broader than being Enayat.
We may now formulate the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3.13. No finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory is Enayat.
Equivalently, no finitely axiomatized consistent sequential theory has a sententially
restricted self-interpretation. ❍
3.5. Preservation over mutual interpretability. Surprisingly, Enayatness is
preserved for over mutual interpretability if we take R rather than Succ0 as the
basic arithmetical theory that provides the numerals. More precisely we have the
following.
Theorem 3.14. Suppose K : U V , M : V U , N : V R, P : V  (V +TB−VN ).
Here the superscript V is there to remind us that we consider TB for the singature
of V . Let E : V → (V +TB−VN ) be the identical embedding. Let N
∗ := K ◦P ◦E ◦N .
Then, U is an N∗-Enayat theory.
Proof. Let Q0 := K ◦ P ◦ E ◦M . So, Q0 : U  U . More graphically, the situation
looks like this (using the category theoretical notation for interpretations):
U
M
−→ V
E
−→ (V + TB−VN )
P
−→ V
K
−→ U
We extend Q0 to Q : U  (U +TB
−U
N∗ ) as follows: τQ is τQ0 on the vocabulary of U .
• TτQ(~x) :↔ TK◦P (τ˜M (~x)).
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Here τ˜M is the arithmetization of τM in N
∗. We have:
U ⊢ TQ(pAqN
∗
) ↔ TK◦P (τ˜M (pAq
N∗))
↔ TK◦P (pAMq
N∗
)
↔ (T(pAMq
N
))K◦P
↔ (AM )K◦P
↔ AK◦P◦E◦M
↔ AQ0
↔ AQ ❑
We have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.15. Suppose U and V are mutually interpretable Vaught theories.
Suppose further that V is an Enayat theory. Then, U is an Enayat theory.
Open Question 3.16. Are there any other (interesting) relations between theories
that preserve Enayatness? ❍
In case we consider sequential theories, Theorem 3.15 has an important conse-
quence. We remind the reader that every finitely axiomatized sequential A is mu-
tually interpretable with S12 + conρ(A)(A). So, our question about examples of se-
quential Enayat theories reduces to the question whether S12 plus a true Π
0
1-sentence
can be Enayat.
We can strengthen our question as follows.
Conjecture 3.17. Suppose A is finitely axiomatized and consistent and sequential.
Let N : S12  A. Then, there is no extension of S
1
2 that is mutually interpretable
with A+ TB−N .
It is a well known open question whether every sequential theory is mutually in-
terpretable with an extension-in-the-same-language of S12. Our conjecture provides
a possible example to illustrate a negative answer to this question. ❍
We can view the preservation over mutual interpretability a bit more abstractly in
the case of Vaught theories. Suppose we work with the degrees of interpretability of
Vaught theories. In this case the Tarski functor (based on) T(U) := U + TB−N (U),
where N is some N : R  U , makes sense, since we have already shown the inde-
pendence of N .
We check that T is indeed a functor. Suppose K : U  V . Then, we can extend
τK to, say, τ˜K as follows. Suppose N : R  U . We choose T over V w.r.t. the
NK-numerals. We extend τK to τ
∗
K by setting Tτ∗K (~x) :↔ T(τ˜K(~x)), where τ˜K is
the formalization of τK .
We note that an Enayat Vaught theory is precisely a T-algebra. So, it is imme-
diate that being an Enayat theory is preserved under mutual interpretability which
is after all the isomorphism of our category.
Perhaps it is possible to make T work for a better category, but I did not explore
this.
Here is an alternative formulation of conjecture 3.7. Let’s say that a theory U
is quasi-finite iff, for some finitely axiomatized A, we have U ≡ A.
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Conjecture 3.18. Suppose U is a consistent Vaught theory. Then T(U) is not
quasi-finite. ❍
To see the equivalence, we present the following consideration. Clearly, if there
were a consistent and Vaught Enayat theory A, then T(A) would be quasi-finite.
Conversely, suppose U is consistent and Vaught. Suppose T(U) ≡ A. There is a
finitely axiomatized sub-theory V0 of T(U) such that V0  A. We choose V0 large
enough so that it is a Vaught theory. Let U0 consist of the U -axioms in V0. We
note that U0  V0, since we can interpret finitely many Tarski biconditionals for
free, by Theorem 3.3. Thus, U0  V0 A T(U) T(U0). We may conclude that
U0 is a finitely axiomatized, consistent and Vaught Enayat theory.
4. A consistent, finitely axiomatized Enayat Theory
Is there a finitely axiomatized theory with the N -Enayat property for appropriate
N? If we ask the question in this generality without further constraints on the
admissible theories, there is actually a positive example. The example does depend
on what we accept as a Go¨del numbering. We discuss the issues here below.
We give an example of a finitely axiomatized theory that is not Enayat for
one interpretation (and for any Go¨del numbering) and that is Enayat for another
interpretation for a special choice of the Go¨del numbering.
We consider the theory W := Th0,S,<(N) of 0, < and S in the natural num-
bers. See [End01, Section 3.2] for a careful exposition of this theory. The theory
W is a finitely axiomatizable complete theory, to wit, the theory of a discrete lin-
ear ordering with initial and without final point. Every definable set of numbers
in the language of W over N is either finite or cofinite. Moreover, inspection of
the quantifier elimination shows that the theory has a multi-exponential decision
algorithm.4
Suppose ı is the direct one-dimensional translation of Succ0 inW that sends 0 to
0 and xSy to Sx = y. Then, clearly, the interpretation Kı of Succ0 in W based on
ı cannot be Enayat for any Go¨del numbering since the set of truths is infinite and
co-infinite. We cannot get around this example by tweaking the Go¨del numbering.
Let W ′ := Th0,S,<,E(N) be the theory of 0, <, S and E, for even, in the natural
numbers Let  be the following two-dimensional translation of the language of W ′
in the language of W .
• δ(x, y) := (y = x ∨ y = x+ 1),
• Z(x, y) := (x = 0 ∧ y = 0),
• (x, y)S(x
′, y′) := ((y = x ∧ x′ = x ∧ y′ = x+ 1) ∨
(y = x+ 1 ∧ x′ = x+ 1 ∧ y′ = x+ 1)),
• (x, y) < (x
′, y′) := ((x′ = x ∧ y < y′) ∨ x < x′).
• E(x, y) := (x = y).
Clearly, this yields an interpretation K of W
′ in W based on . We note that it
follows that W ′ is multi-exponentially decidable.
Let ν be a standard Go¨del numbering for the language ofW . We define ν∗(A) :=
2ν(A) if A is true in N and ν∗(A) = 2ν(A)+1 if A is false. Evidently, ν∗ is a multi-
exponential Go¨del numbering. Let κ translate T to E where κ is the identical
4One further amazing property of Th0,S,<(N) is the fact that it is a finitely axiomatizable
theory that proves full induction.
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translation on the vocabulary of W . Clearly, Kκ : (W + TB
−ν∗
ID ) W
′. Hence,
(Kκ ◦K) : (W + TB
−ν∗
ID )W .
Let N be the interpretation of W in W based on  restricted to the language
without E. We have ⊤ ◮W TB
−ν∗
N , showing that Tarski’s Theorem on the undefin-
ability of truth fails in our example for a specific choice of Go¨del numbering and a
specific choice of the numbers. Of course, there is nothing remarkable about this
failure, since we do not have the Fixed Point Lemma in this context.
We note that we can do the same trick for, e.g., Presburger Arithmetic. However,
Presburger is not finitely axiomatizable.
The reader may object that our Go¨del numbering ν∗ is contrived, unnatural and
an ignoble hack. However, it seems very difficult to exclude it on principled reasons.
One may want to demand that Go¨del numberings are p-time. However, many of
the classical Go¨del numberings were exponential or even multi-exponential. This is
witnessed by, e.g., the Go¨del numbering in Feferman’s celebrated arithmetization
paper [Fef58].
Open Question 4.1. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A with
the N -Enayat property for some N : Succ0  A, when we demand that the Go¨del
numbering is p-time computable? ❍
Open Question 4.2. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A such
that we have the Enayat property for all N : Succ0 A? ❍
5. Neighbours
In this section, we discuss uniform variants of TB−. We will see that for the
uniform variants we have a clear negative answer —quite unlike the stubborn purely
sentential case of TB−.
Remark 5.1. When writing this paper I discovered that much more can be said
about uniform biconditionals and Vaught theories. I postpone this to a subsequent
paper. ❍
We fix a theory U with an interpretation N : U  Succ0. In order to avoid heavy
and sometimes misleading notations, we assume N to be one-dimensional. Nothing
depends on this however.
5.1. Satisfaction. We strengthen TB−N to a uniform principle USB
−
1,N in the fol-
lowing way.
USB−1,N : ∀x (sat(x, pA(v)q)↔ A(x)).
Here A is a U -formula with at most one free variable v and sat is a new binary
predicate. Note that this definition is meaningful also in case our theory is not
Vaught.
In case U is Vaught, we also have the following seemingly stronger principle.
USB−N : ∀a (sat(a, pA(v0, . . . , vn−1)q)↔ A(a(pv0q), . . . , a(pvn−1q))).
Here a ranges over assignments, i.e., partial functions from a finite set of variables
to domain objects. If vi is not in the domain, we set value of the variable to some
default value x∗. Regrettably, in the general case, x∗ must be a parameter, since
there need not be definable elements in the ambient theory U .
Theorem 5.2. Suppose U is a Vaught theory and N : U  R. Then, we have
USB−1,N ◮◭U USB
−
N .
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Proof. If we start with U + USB−N , we can use Fujimoto translation τ with:
• satτ (x, y) := sat({〈pvq, x〉}, y).
We note that we pretended that we have functionality. In reality, we should have
said that there is a representative u of pvq, a representative w of the pair 〈u, x〉,
a representative z of the set {w}, such that sat(z, y). Moreover, what counts as a
representative of 〈u, x〉, should also be further spelled out.
Suppose we start with U +USB−1,N . We define a recursive function F that sends
a code of a formula A(v0, . . . , vn−1) to a code of A(v(pv0q), . . . , v(pvn−1q)). Here
of course the functions should be unraveled to their relational representations. Par
abus de langage, we use F also for the arithmetization of F in R. We now use the
following Fujimoto translation ν:
• satν(a, y) := sat(a, FN (y)).
Again, unraveling is needed to give the formula its correct form:
∃z ∈ δN (F
N (y, z) ∧ sat(a, z)). ❑
Theorem 5.3. If U is Vaught and N , N ′ are interpretations in U of Succ0 (or,
if you wish, R), then USB−1,N and USB
−
1,N ′ and USB
−
N and USB
−
N ′ are mutually
Fujimoto interpretable over U .
The proof is entirely analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.4. We also have:
Theorem 5.4. ⊤ ◮loc,U USB
−
1,N and ⊤ ◮loc,U USB
−
N .
Proof. We treat the case of USB−1,N . We interpret the axioms
A0(y)↔ sat(y, pA0q), . . . , An−1(y)↔ sat(y, pAn−1q),
by defining: sat(y, x) :↔
∨
k<n(p˜Akq(x) ∧ Ak(y)). ❑
Here is a basic insight.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose N : U  Succ0. Then, 0(U) (U +USB
−
N ), and, similarly
for USB−1,N .
Proof sketch. In 0(U) we can build a Henkin interpretation H of U . (See [Vis18a].)
This Henkin interpretation comes with a satisfaction predicate H that works on a
0(U)-cut I. Since 0(U) is sequential, there is a definable isomorphism F between
a cut of I and a cut of NH . We take sat(x, y) := ∃x′ ∃y′ (x′Fx ∧ y′Fy ∧ H(x′, y′)).
❑
We discuss two alternative forms of USB−N . Let us write comm(sat, x) for: for all
formulas ≤ x, the predicate sat satisfies the commutation conditions (w.r.t. the
signature of U). Suppose U is a Vaught theory and that N : U  R. We define:
Comm−0,N : comm(sat, n
N ), for n ∈ ω.
As is well known the theory R interprets an extension, say R+, which verifies that
≤ is a linear ordering. See [Vis14b]. Suppose U is a Vaught theory and that
N : U  R+.
Comm−1,N : ∀x ∈ J comm(sat, x), ∀x ∈ J ∀y ≤ x y ∈ J, n ∈ J, for any n ∈ ω.
Here J is a new unary predicate.
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We assume that our Go¨del coding is monotonic in the sense the the code of a
subformula of A is less that the code of A itself.
Theorem 5.6. Suppose U is a Vaught theory. We have:
a. If N : U  R, then USB−N and Comm
−
0,N are interderivable over U .
b. If N : U  R+, then Comm−1,N ⊢U Comm
−
0,N and Comm
−
0,N ◮U Comm
−
1,N .
Proof. Ad (a): The inference from Comm−0,N to USBN is obvious. We treat the
case of existential quantification for the other direction. We reason in U + USBN .
We write a˘ for a[pviq : vi], the result of resetting a on pviq to vi.
sat(a, ∃viA(v0, . . . , vi, . . . , vn−1)) ↔ ∃viA(a(pv0q), . . . , vi, . . . , a(pvn−1q))
↔ ∃viA(a˘(pv0q), . . . , a˘(pviq), . . . , a˘(pvn−1q))
↔ ∃vi sat(a˘, pA(v0, . . . , vi, . . . , vn−1)q)
Ad (b): This is mostly trivial. We interpret J(x) as comm(sat, x). ❑
The difference between Comm−0,N and Comm
−
1,N may seem somewhat trifling, but
the usefulness of Comm−1,N lies in the fact that there may be other more interesting
interpretations of J.
We note that Comm−0,N is a restricted axiomatization of USB
−
N over U . This
means that all axioms of Comm−0,N have depth-of-quantifier-alternations complexity
below a fixed n. This suggests the following question.
Open Question 5.7. Does TB−N have a restricted axiomatization over U? ❍
5.2. Truth. There is also the alternative option of defining a truth principle.
UTB−N : ∀~x ∈ δN (TpA~˙x q↔ A~x).
We note that to make sense of this we must stipulate that (i) N is an interpretation
of S12 and that (ii) we use efficient numerals, since, for ordinary numerals, the
mapping from x to the numeral of x is exponential.
It is not clear to me that, in this case, we have an analogue of Theorem 5.3,
i.e., that UTB−N ◮◭U UTB
−
N ′ . However, as we will see, it is immediate from Theo-
rem 5.12, that these theories are mutually interpretable in the sequential case.
Here is a first small insight.
Theorem 5.8. Let U be sequential and N : U  S12. Then, USB
−
N ◮U UTB
−
N .
Proof sketch. We have to define the predicate T from sat. Consider a number a.
In case a is not an N -code of a U -sentence we make T(a) false. Suppose U is an
N -code of a U -sentence. Now we have to analyze a as being a substitution instance
of a U -formula b with numerals. There are two obstacles:
• There are not really numerals in b, since we work with a relational signature. So, we
have to reverse the term-unwinding translation to obtain the relevant numerals. To do
this we need a precise analysis of term-unwinding. Also, we should take care that the
reverse algorithm is p-time.
• In the A(~˙x) of UTB−
N
there could be already numerals in the standard context A(·).
However U having just a as input cannot know which numerals are the numerals to
replace by variables. Fortunately, it is sufficient to remove numerals maximally. The case
where there are some numerals in A(·) can be recovered by substituting some numerals
in the result of maximal analysis.
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Given that we analyzed a as substitution instance of b where we replace numeral c
by variable v, we can compute a corrresponding assignment f that sends v to the
value of c. Now we define T(a) by sat(f, b). ❑
We do not generally have that TB−N ◮U UTB
−
N .
Theorem 5.9. TB−ID 6◮EA UTB
−
ID.
Proof. Suppose TB−ID ◮EA UTB
−
ID. Then, it follows that TBID ◮PA UTBID. Here the
lack of the superscript minus means that we extend induction to the full language.
However, there is a model of PA+TB−ID that is not recursively saturated, where all
models of PA+ UTB−ID are recursively saturated. See [Cie17]. ❑
Open Question 5.10. The argument above works for all subtheories of PA that
extend R and more, but still it is rather special. Can we improve it to show that
the result holds for all sequential theories? ❍
5.3. 0. We now connect uniform biconditionals with the 0-functor.
Theorem 5.11. Suppose U is sequential and N : US12. Then (U+UTB
−
N )0(U).
Proof sketch. In U + UTB−N , we can define the intersection J of all virtual classes
{x ∈ δN | T(a(x˙))} that are N -cuts. One can show that J is an N -cut contained
in all U -definable cuts. Thus, in J , we have all restricted consistency statements
of U . ❑
We partially summarize the above in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.12. Suppose U is sequential and N : U  S12. Then, following theories
are mutually interpretable: 0(U), U + USB−N , U + USB
−
0,N , U + Comm
−
0,N , U +
Comm−1,N , U + UTB
−
N .
As a consequence, a sequential theory is uniformly Enayat, in any of the possible
senses, iff it is reflexive.
Proof. We have:
• 0(U) (U + USB−N ), by Theorem 5.5;
• USB−N ⊲⊳U USB
−
0,N , by Theorem 5.2;
• U +Comm−0,N , U +Comm
−
1,N and U +USB
−
N are mutually interpretable by
Theorem 5.6;
• (U + USB−N ) (U + UTB
−
N), by Theorem 5.8;
• (U + UTB−N )0(U), by Theorem 5.11.
The last step completes the circle. ❑
We note that theories like PRA and PA and ZF are reflexive and, hence, sequential
uniform Enayat theories.
We also note that the characterization of 0(U) as U + USB−N (modulo mutual
interpretability) has the advantage of having the Go¨del numbering as conventional
element, but not the proof system, the arithmetization of the proof system and the
like.
The following corollary is immediate.
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Corollary 5.13. No finitely axiomatized, consistent uniform sequential theory is
uniformly Enayat.
So, for example, none of S12, EA, ACA0, GB is uniformly Enayat.
Open Question 5.14. Can we prove the non-existence of a finitely axiomatized
consistent sequential uniform Enayat theory without a detour over the second in-
completeness theorem? ❍
More can be said about USB in the context of Vaught theories. We hope to do that
in a subsequent paper. A salient open question is as follows.
Open Question 5.15. Is there a finitely axiomatized Vaught theory that is uni-
formly Enayat? Here uniformity is explicated using USB−. ❍
6. Finite extensions of TB−
In this section, we formulate two conjectures in the environment of Conjec-
ture 3.13.
Consider a theory U of signature Θ0. Let Θ1 be Θ0 extended with a unary
predicate T and let Θ2 be binary predicate symbol sat. The variables α, β, . . .
range over sentences of Θ2. We take as the default that a theory has as signature
the minimal signature demanded by its axioms.
In this vocabulary, we can state Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth
as follows.
Theorem 6.1 (Tarski). Suppose U is consistent and N : U  R. Then, we have
⊤ 6◮U TB
−
N .
From Tarski’s work on truth we also know the following.
Theorem 6.2 (Tarski). Suppose U is a Vaught theory and N : U  R. Then,
(∀x ∈ δN comm(sat, x)) ◮U TB
−
N .
Of course, this is just a watered down version of Theorem 5.6(a).
In the next theorem, we show that there is no ‘best’, in the sense of ‘weakest’,
finite extension of a Vaught theory U in an extended signature that Fujimoto in-
terprets TB−N over U . So, certainly the commutation conditions, as articulated by
∀x ∈ δN comm(sat, x), are not ‘best’.
Theorem 6.3. Suppose U is a consistent Vaught theory and N : U  R. Suppose
α ◮U TB
−
N . Then, there is a β with β ◮U USB
−
N , but β 6◮U α.
It follows that for γ := (α ∨ β), we have TB−N ◭–\ U γ ◭–\ U α. Moreover, in case
α ◮U USB
−
N , we find USB
−
N ◭–\ U γ ◭–\ U α.
The proof is a variation of proof of Theorem 4.1, case (A), of [PV19].
Proof. Suppose A is of the form ∃x ∈ δN A0(x). We write C(A), for ‘if there is
no witness x of A such that x ≤ y, then comm(sat, y)’. In other words, C(A) is
¬ ((∃y ∈ δN ¬ comm(sat, y)) ≤ A).
We write δ ◮U η as ∃p ∃τ proofU+δ(p, η
τ ). By the Fixed Point Lemma, we find
B such that R ⊢ B ↔ C(BN ) ◮U α. We take β := C(B
N ).
Suppose β ◮U α. Then, we find that B is true and, hence, B has a standard
witness inside U,N . However, finitely many commutation conditions are Fujimoto-
interpretable in U , by the combination of Theorems 5.4 and 5.6(a). Hence, we have
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⊤ ◮U β ◮U α ◮U TB
−
N , contradicting Tarski’s Theorem on the undefinability of
truth. So, β 6◮U α.
It follows that BN has no standard witness inside U +β. So, U +β provides the
commutation conditions at all standardly finite levels, i.e., β ◮U Comm0,N . Hence,
as desired, β ◮U USB
−
N . ❑
Remark 6.4. We note that, in the proof of Theorem 6.3, the sentence B is a fixed
point of a formula of essentially the form ‘provable . . . ’. This might convey the
impression that we have Go¨delean self-reference here. However, the internal C(B)
has Rosser-form. Thus, it seems very improbable that B is uniquely determined
by the equation even if our numbers satisfy S12. For the same reason, an ‘explicit’
solution for B seems improbable. ❍
Conjecture 6.5. Let U be Vaught. and let N : RU . Suppose α ◮U TB
−
N . Then,
α ◮U USB
−
N .
We can put further demands on U and N : that U be sequential, finitely axioma-
tized, etcetera; that N is an interpretation of S12, etcetera. Also, when N interprets
S12, we may replace USB
−
N by UTB
−
N . ❍
We note that the Tarski commutation conditions, are an example of such an α. We
note that the construction in the proof of Theorem 6.3 does not immediately help
to refute the conjecture. However, it cannot be excluded that some variant of the
argument does refute the conjecture.
Remark 6.6. Conjecture 6.5 can be connected to the Davidsonian idea that we
need compositionality to obtain a finite axiomatization of the Tarski Biconditionals.
❍
Remark 6.7. The only paper I could find asking a question in the neighbourhood
of Conjecture 6.5 is [FM84]. However, Fine and McCarthy work with what they
call segregated languages. Their format does not seem to fit ours. Moreover, they
do not work with Fujimoto interpretability. It would be well worth exploring what
of their work can be adapted to our context. ❍
Remark 6.8. Conjecture 6.5 suggests the concept of Fujimoto preservativity 3.
We define:
• Γ3U ∆ iff, for all α such that α ◮U Γ, we have α ◮U ∆.
Here, the most elegant approach is to take α, Γ and ∆ to be in the language of U expanded with
a binary predicate. We also want to apply the notion if one of the expansions is to unary, but we
can choose some standard way to let a binary predicate pose as a unary one, e.g., we might take
Rxx for Px. Alternatively, in a context where we have pairing, we might only consider expansions
with a unary predicate. A final alternative is to assume that intended signatures for α, Γ and ∆
are given in the context.
Now Conjecture 6.5 becomes: we have TB−N 3U UTB
−
N .
We note that Γ ◮U ∆ implies Γ3U ∆. Moreover, 3U is reflexive and transitive.
❍
Here is our second conjecture.
Conjecture 6.9. Suppose A is a finitely axiomatized Vaught in signature Θ0.
Let N : A  R. Suppose further that ⊤ A TB
−
N . Then, there is a β such that
⊤A β ◮A TB
−
N .
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More generally, we may conjecture the following. Suppose A is a finitely axiom-
atized Vaught theory and ⊤ A V . Then, there is a B such that ⊤ A B ◮A V .
❍
We have:
Theorem 6.10. The truth of Conjectures 6.5 and 6.9 combined implies the truth
of Conjecture 3.13.
Proof. Suppose ⊤ A TB
−
N . Let β be as promised in Conjecture 6.9, so we have
⊤A β ◮A TB
−
N . It follows, by Conjecture 6.5, that ⊤A β ◮A USB
−
N . However,
we have already seen that, in the sequential case, ⊤ 6A USB
−
N . ❑
7. A provability predicate
In the present section we follow the Saccheri strategy. We assume that we have
a finitely axiomatized, sequential A that is Enayat. We pretend that it is consistent
and explore it as an interesting new world.
7.1. Preliminary considerations. The first thing that one thinks of is the Liar
Paradox for the TB−-truth predicate. More precisely: suppose we have an interpre-
tationK : A(A+TB−N0), where N0 : AS
1
2. Let F := FN,NK be the usual isomor-
phism between initial cuts of N0 and N0K. We define K(~x) :↔ ∃~y (~x F ~y ∧T
K(~y)).
We write KB for K(pBqN0). By the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, we find L such
that A ⊢ L ↔ ¬KL. We can see that the truth value of L has to alternate if
we travel inside K, K2, K3, . . . . Also, we have (IDA〈L〉K) : A  (A + L) and
(K〈L〉IDA) : A (A+ ¬L). However, nothing paradoxical follows.
5
We can see that without some further idea nothing paradoxical can follow, since
if U is e.g. EA+ {conn(EA) | n ∈ ω} we do have that (i) U is a restricted theory in
the sense that the complexity of all its axioms is bounded by a fixed n and (ii) U
is reflexive for the identical interpretation and, so, U  (U + TB−IDU ).
Thus, we need to add an ingredient that essentially uses the fact the A is finitely
axiomatized rather than just restricted. In this section, this ingredient is the use
of a new provability predicate for A, the good properties of which are based on A’s
finite axiomatizability. In Section 8, the ingredient is the use of a conjecture that
is supposed to hold only for finitely axiomatizable sequential theories.
7.2. What we fix. In this section, we consider a number of things as fixed:
i. the theory A itself;
ii. the interpretation S that witnesses the sequentiality of A; we note that, by cut-
elimination, the proof of ASS can be taken to have complexitymax(ρ(A), ρ(S))+
a0; here a0 is a constant for overhead.
iii. the interpretation N0 of S
1
2; we note that, by cut-elimination, the proof of
(S12)
N0 can be taken to have complexity max(ρ(A), ρ(N0)) + a1; we note that,
since there is a known interpretation of S12 in AS, there is an N0 of complexity
ρ(S) + a2;
iv. the interpretation K of A+ TB−N0 in A.
We note that the complexity of K(n) is ρ(K) + ρ(N0) + a3, where a3 is a constant
for overhead.
5We pick up the idea of using an analogue of a semantical paradox in Section 8.
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7.3. The provability predicate. Let n ≥ a∗ := max(ρ(A), ρ(K) + ρ(N0)) + a,
where a is suitable constant number that is needed for the overhead in our reasoning.
We note that in the context of our reasoning a∗ functions as a constant since we
treat A, K and N0 as fixed.
Our new provability predicate is △A,(n)B := A,n KB. We note that n ≥ a
∗ is
precisely what is needed to make △A,(n) a meaningful notion. We use subscript (n)
rather that n to remind the reader that the subscript is not a constraint on the
sentences for which our predicate is meaningful.
We will omit the subscript A since A is fixed in this section and we will have to
work with a whole circus of sub- and superscripts anyway.
We remind the reader of the Lo¨b conditions. For a brief moment, we view △ as
an abstract operator.
L1. ⊢ B ⇒ ⊢ △B,
L2. ⊢ (△B ∧ △(B → C))→ △C,
L3. ⊢ △B → △△B,
L4. ⊢ △(△B → B)→ △B.
We will also consider the condition C, to wit:
C. ⊢ △B → B.
In the next subsection, we discuss variants of L1 and L2 for the predicate △N(n),
where N is a cut of N0.
7.4. The first two Lo¨b conditions. Let N be an A-definable, A-verifiable cut of
N0. We note that N has the same numerals as N0. Let n ≥ a
∗.
Theorem 7.1. We have:
A. if A ⊢ B, then S12 ⊢ △(n)B, and, hence A ⊢ △
N
(n)B. Thus, this gives us L1 in
the form:
A ⊢ B ⇒ A ⊢ △N(n)B.
B. We also have a second form that is a better ‘externalisation’ of L3.
A ⊢n KB ⇒ A ⊢n K△
N
(n)B.
Proof. Ad (A): Suppose A ⊢ B. Then, A ⊢ BK and, hence, A ⊢ KB. By cut-
elimination, we have A ⊢n KB. By Σ1-completeness, in the meta-theory, we find
S12 ⊢ n KB, i.o.w., S
1
2 ⊢ △(n)B.
Ad (B): Suppose A ⊢n KB. Then, S
1
2 ⊢ △(n)B. It follows that A ⊢ △
NK
(n) B and,
hence, A ⊢ K△N(n)B. By cut-elimination, we find A ⊢n K△
N
(n)B. ❑
As the reader can see, n is, in this theorem, not constrained by N . The reason is
that, since N is initial in N0, the N -numerals simply are the N0-numerals.
We note that in both proofs we used cut-elimination. Thus, the proofs can be
executed in meta-theory EA+, i.e., I∆0 + supexp. So, we have:
• EA+ ⊢ B → △N(n)B,
• EA+ ⊢ △(n)B → △(n)△
N
(n)B.
However, on closer inspection, we have a much better result. We suppose that A,
n, N and K are externally given. Then, the first form only requires S12 and the
second form only requires EA := I∆0 + exp. We will discuss this in detail when we
consider proofs of L3 in the next subsection.
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Theorem 7.2. We have S12 ⊢ (△AB ∧ △A(B → C)) → △C. So, a fortiori, the
theory A satisfies L2 for △NA .
Proof. We have:
A ⊢ K(B → C) → (B → C)K
→ (BK → CK)
→ (KB → KC).
By cut-elimination, A ⊢n K(B → C)→ (KB → KC). It follows by Σ1-completeness
that S12 ⊢ n(K(B → C)→ (KB → KC)). By L2 for n, we find:
S12 ⊢ n K(B → C)→ ( n KB → n KC).
In other words, S12 ⊢ (△B ∧ △(B → C))→ △C. ❑
We note that there does not seem to be a way to prove the uniform version
  S12 ⊢ ∀B,C ((△AB ∧ △A(B → C))→ △C).   
The quantifier over sentences seems essentially external.
Remark 7.3. With the first Lo¨b condition in hand, we can immediately prove the
well-known properties of the Go¨del sentences. Let N and n be as before. By the
Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, we find GN,n := G such that S
1
2 ⊢ G ↔ ¬△(n)G
N .
Suppose A ⊢ GN . Then, by L1, A ⊢ △N(n)G
N . On the other hand, by the Fixed
Point Equation, A ⊢ ¬△N(n)G
N . It follows that A ⊢ ⊥.
We cannot similarly derive Lo¨b’s Rule as will be illustrated in Subsection 7.5.
The derivation of the Rule does need some form of L3. ❍
7.5. Guarded reflection. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 7.4. For any n, there is an A-definable, A-verifiable N0-cut In with ρ-
complexity of order bn+max(ρ(S), ρ(N0)) + c, such that, for all B with ρ(B) ≤ n,
we have A ⊢ Inn B → B.
See [Vis18b], for a careful treatment of this result (or, rather, a result of which this
result is an immediate consequence). We now have a form of guarded reflection for
△.
Theorem 7.5. Let n ≥ a∗. Then, we have A ⊢ △In(n)B → B
K .
As preparation for Remark 7.7, we formulate a well-know lemma that is due to
Pudla´k. See [Pud85].
Lemma 7.6. Suppose N,N ′ : A  S12. There is an N -cut CN,N ′ and a definable
isomorphic embedding FN,N ′ : CN,N ′ → N
′. We have:
ρ(CN,N′) = max(ρ(S), ρ(N), ρ(N
′)) + d and ρ(FN,N′) = max(ρ(S), ρ(N), ρ(N
′)) + e.
We write ▽ for ¬△¬.
Remark 7.7. We have A ⊢ ▽In(n)⊤. So, we immediately see that the Second
Completeness Theorem fails. Hence, a fortiori, Lo¨b’s Rule fails.
If we did not have the guard K, we would have A’s inconsistency. Let N be
a cut of In. Then, we have A ⊢ △
N
(n)G
N
N,n → G
N
N,n. Hence, A ⊢ G
N
N,n and, so
A ⊢ △N(n)G
N
N,n, which gives A ⊢ ¬G
N
N,n. So A ⊢ ⊥.
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One thing one could try, in order to get the effect of the above reasoning, is to
get under the guard using Lemma 7.6. We have a brief look, to see why this idea
fails. Suppose N is a cut both of In and CN0,N0K .
We first try GN,n. We reason in A. Suppose △
N
(n)G
N
N,n. Then, by guarded
reflection, GNKN,n. But also △
N0K
(n) G
N
N,n. Hence, ¬G
N0K
N,n . However, since NK is
smaller than N0K, no contradiction materializes.
Next we try GN0,n. We reason in A. Suppose △
N
(n)G
N0
N0,n
. Then, by guarded
reflection, GN0KN0,n. But also △
N0K
(n) G
N0
N0,n
. Hence, ¬GN0KN0,n. A contradiction. So,
canceling the assumption, we find ¬△N(n)G
N0
N0,n
, i.e. GNN0,n. Returning to the meta-
language, we see that A ⊢ GNN0,n. Of course, this is still no contradiction.
The result of these two attempts is somewhat disappointing. However, we will
see in Subsection 7.7 that a Go¨del-style argument does give us some information
about K. ❍
7.6. The third and fourth Lo¨b condition. We write for provability in S12.
We define itexp(0, x) := x and itexp(y + 1, x) := 2itexp(y,x).
We start with a lemma.
Lemma 7.8. Suppose n ≥ max(ρ(A), ρ(B)). We have S12 ⊢ B → nB.
Proof. We use the version of cut-elimination from Buss’ paper [Bus15]. By formal-
izing Buss’ result, we have, S12-verifiably, that whenever p is a proof and whenever
itexp(ρ(p) + 2, p) exists, then we have a cut-free proof q with the same conclusion.
Secondly, we use an insight from Pudla´k’s paper [Pud85], that,
S12 ⊢ ∃w 2
y = w → ∀x∃z itexp(y, x) = z.
We reason as follows inside S12. Suppose p is an A-proof of B. Then, ρ(p) is a
logarithmic number. So ∃z itexp(ρ(p) + 2, p) = z. We also find proofA(p,B).
Hence, inside we have a cut-free proof q that witnesses nB. ❑
Let N and N ′ be A-definable, A-verifiable cuts of N0 and let n ≥ a
∗. We first
internalize Theorem 7.1(A).
Theorem 7.9. We have S12 ⊢ B → △(n)B, and, hence,
S12 ⊢ B → △
N
(n)B and A ⊢
N ′ B → N
′
△
N
(n)B.
Proof. The proof is an internalization and refinement of the proof of Theorem 7.1(A).
We note that externally we have A ⊢ BK ↔ KB, and, thus, S12 ⊢ (B
K ↔ KB). It
follows that (†) S12 ⊢ B
K ↔ KB.
We reason in S12. Suppose B. Then, since A is finitely axiomatized and in-
terpretations give p-time transformations of proofs, we have BK . Hence, by (†),
KB. By Lemma 7.8, it follows that n KB, i.o.w., △(n)B. ❑
We proceed with an internalization of Theorem 7.1(B). Let N and N ′ be as before.
Let n ≥ a∗. We use a slightly more general formulation with an extra m for later
use.
Theorem 7.10. Suppose S is in Σb1 and m ≥ ρ(S) + ρ(K) + ρ(N) + f0, where
f0 is a constant for overhead. We have S
1
2 ⊢ S → △(m)S
N . Hence, we have
A ⊢ SN
′
→ △N
′
(m)S
N .
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Proof. We have A ⊢ SNK → KSN . So, by cut-elimination, A ⊢m S
NK → KSN .
Note that this makes sense only under our assumption on m. By Σ1-completeness,
we find: S12 ⊢ m(S
NK → KSN). Hence, (†) S12 ⊢ m S
NK
n → △(m)S
N .
We reason in S12. Suppose S. By ∃Σ
b
1-completeness, we have m S
NK . By
applying (†), we find △(m)S
N . ❑
By specializing Theorem 7.10, we find:
Theorem 7.11. Suppose m ≥ ρ(K)+ρ(N)+ f, where f is a constant for overhead.
We have S12 ⊢ △(n)B → △(m)△
N
(n)B. Hence, we have A ⊢ △
N ′
(n)B → △
N ′
(m)△
N
(n)B.
Now, putting m = n, L4 follows in the usual way from L1,2,3 in combination with
the Fixed Point Lemma.
Theorem 7.12. Under the assumption that n ≥ ρ(K) + ρ(N) + f, we have:
S12 ⊢ △(n)(△
N
(n)B → B)→ △(n)B.
Hence, we have:
A ⊢ △N
′
(n)(△
N
(n)B → B)→ △
N ′
(n)B.
Assuming A to be consistent, we note that, for any n and N satisfying the assump-
tion of Theorem 7.12, we cannot have guarded reflection for △N(n). Otherwise, we
would have both Lo¨b’s Theorem and guarded reflection at the same time. But this
is impossible since it would follow that A ⊢ ▽N,(n)⊤.
We can give an alternative form of L3 where we eliminate the lower bound on n
at the cost of relativizing the antecedent to a cut.
Theorem 7.13. 1. Consider any m. There is an S12-cut Jm, such that ρ(Jm) is
of order gn+ h and S12 ⊢ ∀x ∈ Jm ∃w itexp(m,x) = w.
2. Suppose m,n ≥ a∗. Then, S12 ⊢ △
Jm+2
(m) B → △(n)B.
Proof. Ad (1): The proof is essentially contained in [Pud83] or [Pud85]. Given any
cut I, we consider the virtual class {x | 2x ∈ I}. This class is downward closed
and closed under successor. We shorten it to a cut J . Inspecting the construction,
clearly, ρ(J) = ρ(I) + g. We obtain Jm by iterating the construction starting from
the identical cut.
Ad (2): We reason in S12. Suppose △
Jm+2
(m) B. This means
Jm+2
m KB. Let the
witnessing proof be p. Since p ∈ Jm+2, we find, by (1), that itexp(m+ 2, p) exists.
So, by the cut-elimation theorem from [Bus15], we find a∗ KB, so, a fortiori,
n KB, i.e., △(n)B. ❑
It is always good to have an alternative proof of a result. In the proof of The-
orem 7.13, we used S12-formalization of Buss’ result of [Bus15], a delicate result
that involves many details. So, it improves our confidence to have a variant of
Theorem 7.13(2), with a different proof.
We write K˜ for ¬K¬. Let HC : (S
1
2 + a∗ K˜C)  (A + K˜C) be the Henkin
interpretation based on a∗ K˜C. See [Vis18a]. We note that HC is uniform in
C. We can view ‘C’ as a variable. Let Dm be the common cut in S
1
2 of the
identical interpretation and all the ImHC , for C such that a∗ K˜C. We note that
the complexity of HC is a small standard number independent of C. So, ρ(Dm) is
ρ(Im) plus some standard constant.
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Theorem 7.14. Suppose m,n ≥ a∗. Then, S12 ⊢ △
Dm
(m)B → △(n)B.
Proof. We reason in S12. Suppose n K˜C. Then, a fortiori, we have a∗ K˜C and,
hence, (A+ K˜C)HC . So, we have, by reasoning inside HC , that
ImHC
(m) K˜C. Hence,
by the definition of Dm, we find
Dm
(m) K˜C.
We return to the meta-language. We note that A ⊢ K¬B ↔ ¬KB, and, hence
A ⊢n K¬B ↔ ¬KB and A ⊢m K¬B ↔ ¬KB. So, S
1
2 ⊢ n K¬B ↔ n ¬KB and,
similarly, for m. Hence, putting C := ¬B, we obtain our desired result. ❑
Let S be again Σb1, let N again be a cut of N0 and let again n ≥ a
∗. Let m∗ :=
ρ(S) + ρ(K) + ρ(N) + f0.
Theorem 7.15. We have S12 ⊢ S
Jm∗+2 → △(n)S
N .
Proof. We reason in S12. Suppose S
Jm∗+2 . By Theorem 7.10, we have △
Jm∗+2
(m∗) S
N .
By Theorem 7.13, it follows that △nS
N . ❑
By specializing we find the following. Let m∗ := ρ(K) + ρ(N) + f.
Theorem 7.16. We have S12 ⊢ △
Jm∗+2
(n) B → △(n)△
N
(n)B.
We have the following extension of Theorem 7.15. This version could play a role in
the development of Rosser arguments. Let S be Σ01, let N be a cut of N0 and let
n ≥ a∗. Let m∗ := ρ(S) + ρ(K) + ρ(N) + f1.
Theorem 7.17. We have S12 ⊢ S
Jm∗+4 → △(n)S
N .
Proof. This uses the well-known fact that S12 ⊢ S
J2 → ρ(S)+i S. See [HP93]. Here
i s a small constant for overhead. ❑
Remark 7.18. Suppose N is shorter than In. Let G := GN,n. We reason in A.
Suppose △JnN(n) G
N . Then, since JnN is initial in N , we have △
N
(n)G
N . On the other
hand, we have △N(n)△
N
(n)G
N , and, hence, △N(n)¬G
N . Thus, △N(n)⊥. Quod non. So,
canceling our assumption, we find ¬△JnN(n) G
N and, thus, GJnN .
Note the analogy of the present result with the result of Remark 7.7. ❍
7.7. Under guard. In this subsection, we extract some information from the Go¨del
sentences for △(a∗). Let ℑ := Ia∗ ∩ CN0,N0K .
Theorem 7.19. Suppose A proves that NK is a cut of N0K. Suppose A is con-
sistent. Then, A 0 NK ⊆ FN0,N0K(ℑ).
Proof. Suppose A ⊢ NK ⊆ FN0,N0K(ℑ). Let N˜ := F
−1
N0,N0K
(NK). We note that
FN0,N0K restricted to N˜ is an isomorphism between N˜ and NK. Moreover, N˜ ⊆ ℑ.
Let G := GN,a∗ .
6
6Strictly speaking, we exceed our earlier framework here, since A need not prove that N is a
cut of N0. However, it is easy to see that the marginal extensions does no harm. The skeptical
reader can always replace N by N〈cutN0 (N)〉N0, the interpretation that is N if N is indeed an
N0-cut and that is N0 otherwise.
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We reason in A. Suppose △N˜(a∗)G
N . It follows that △NK(a∗)G
N and, hence ¬GNK .
On the other hand, by guarded reflection, we have GNK . A contradiction. Hence,
by canceling our assumption, ¬△N˜(a∗)G
N , and so GNK .
We return to the meta-language. We have shown that A ⊢ GNK . It follows that
A ⊢a∗ KG
N and, hence, A ⊢ △NK(a∗)G
N . Thus, A ⊢ ¬GNK . But this contradicts the
consistency of A. ❑
Letℑ∗ := FN0,N0K(ℑ) and let X := {ℑ
∗ ⊂ NK | NK is A-provably a cut of N0K}.
Theorem 7.20. Suppose A is consistent. Then, A+ X is also consistent.
Proof. Suppose A + X is inconsistent. Then, for some finite subset X0 of X , we
have A ⊢ ¬
∧
X0.
Let Y0 be the set of N such that ℑ
∗ ⊂ NK is in X0. We have:
A ⊢ ¬
∧
X0 ↔
∨
N∈Y0
ℑ∗ 6⊂ NK
↔
∨
N∈Y0
NK ⊆ ℑ∗
→ (
⋂
N∈Y0
N)K ⊆ ℑ∗
Writing M for
⋂
N∈Y0
N , we find A ⊢ MK ⊆ ℑ∗. But this contradicts Theo-
rem 7.19. ❑
Seeing that any NK such that NK : A  S12 has an initial segment that is K-
internally definably isomorphic to an N0K-cut, Theorem 7.20 tells us that there
is an A-model M in which ℑ is below all K-internal interpretations of S12. This
implies, for example, that for any B and any m ≥ max(ρ(A), ρ(B)), we have M |=
ℑ
mB → B
K .
7.8. Rosser? In this section we discussed the predicate △ and have shown that
it has many good properties. In Remarks 7.3, 7.7, 7.18 and in Subsection 7.7, we
explored what information the Go¨del sentences of △ could provide. However, as we
seen our information until now makes △ too well behaved to obtain a contradiction.
There is clearly an infinity of variations on the Rosser sentences and there is
some hope that these might lead to the desired contradiction.
8. In search of paradox
In this Section we study an attempt to prove Conjecture 3.13 that has some
analogies to a paradox, variants of which were independently found by Stephen
Yablo and the author.
8.1. Motivating remarks. We consider a finitely axiomatized, sequential A with
the Enayat property. Let N0 : S
1
2 → A and let K be defined with respect to N0 as
before. Let us briefly dwell on the Liar for K. By the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, we
find L such that A ⊢ L↔ KL. We note that inside A we have that either L, ¬LK ,
LKK , . . . , or ¬L, LK , ¬LKK , . . . . We also have A ⊢ LID〈L〉K and A ⊢ (¬L)K〈L〉ID,
and, thus, A (A+ L) and A (A+ ¬L). So, L is an Orey sentence for A.
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Nothing dangerous seems to follow from the existence of L since we only get the
alternations. Can be eliminate the alternations by stipulating that L is false in all
iterations of K? Consider L∗ such that A ⊢ L∗ ↔ ∀x ∈ δN0 ¬K
x+1L∗.7 We reason
in A. Suppose L∗. It follows that ¬KL∗ and, thus, ¬ (L∗)K . We may conclude
(∃x ∈ δK K
x+1L∗)K . Now if x were in the common cut CN0,N0K , we would have
our contradiction. So, it follows that N0K contains an element above the common
cut. Suppose we start with ¬L∗, we get ∃x ∈ δK K
x+1L∗. But what then? We
do have A ⊢ (∃x ∈ δK K
x+1L∗)K〈L
∗〉ID. Can we tweak the argument in such a way
that the existential claim gets a numerical witness? If we could, we would have
A ⊢ (Kn+1L∗)K〈L
∗〉ID, and, hence, A ⊢ (L∗ ∧ (Kn+1L∗)K) ∨ (L∗)K
n+1
. It follows
that A ⊢ (L∗ ∧ Kn+2L∗) ∨ (L∗)K
n+1
. The first disjunct leads to a contradiction,
so A ⊢ (L∗)K
n+1
. By the fixed point equation, we find A ⊢ (¬KL∗)K
n+1
, and,
hence, A ⊢ (¬L∗)K
n+2
. On the other hand, since K interprets A in A, we find
A ⊢ (L∗)K
n+2
. So, A is inconsistent.
The above program does not quite work. In the first place, we need to add some
subtle details. In the second place, and more importantly, we need a substantial
conjecture to make it work. However, this conjecture has some interest of its own.
Remark 8.1. The paradoxical reasoning sketched above is reminiscent of the rea-
soning in [Vis04] concerning a descending hierarchy of truth predicates. (The article
was first published in 1989 and the preprint appeared in 1985.) If you forget about
the indices, this argument transforms into the well-known Yablo paradox, first pub-
lished in [Yab85]. ❍
8.2. The Small-is-very-small Principle and its variants. The main idea of
our strategy is the use of some kind of numerical existence principle that allows us
to replace a provable existence claim by a claim about an external number. This
subsection provides the needed existence principle.
A theory is restricted if all of its axioms have depth-of-quantifier-alternations
complexity below a given standard number k.
The Small-is-very-small Principle, or SIVS, tells us that, if a restricted theory
proves that a number with a certain property exists in a sufficiently small cut (‘is
small’) then the theory also believes that the number is standard (‘is very small’).
Here the relevant small cut will depend on the property, or, more precisely the
complexity of the formula defining the property.
Theorem 8.2 (The Small-is-very-small Principle). Consider a restricted sequential
theory U with bound k and let N0 : S
1
2  U . Let B be of the form ∃x ∈ N0B0(x).
Let ℓ be max(k, ρ(B)) plus some constant j for overhead.
U ⊢ ∃x ∈ IℓB0(x) ⇒ for some m we have U ⊢ ∃x ≤ mB0(x).
Here Iℓ is the cut that was introduced in Subsection 7.5. The numeral m is an
N0-numeral.
The proof of Theorem 8.2 is given in full detail in [Vis18b]. Here we provide a
quick sketch. Suppose C is ∃x ∈ δN0 C0 and D is ∃y ∈ δN0 D0. We write C ≤ D
for ∃x ∈ δN0 (C0 ∧ ∀y <
N0 x¬D0).
Proof-sketch. We work under the conditions specified in the theorem.
7We will worry about details of defining the iteration of K later.
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Suppose U ⊢ ∃x ∈ IℓB0(x). It follows that there is a finite subsystem U0 of U
such that U0 ⊢ ∃x ∈ IℓB0(x). We may assume that U0 is sequential and verifies
(S12)
N0 . Now consider R such that U0 ⊢ R↔ B ≤
N0
U0,ℓ
R.
Reason in U0. In case
N0
U0,ℓ
R is not witnessed in Iℓ, we have R by the fixed
point equation. If N0U0,ℓR is witnessed in Iℓ, we have R by reflection. We return to
the meta-language.
We have shown U0 ⊢ R. By cut-elimination, we find U0 ⊢ℓ R. Let m witness
U0 ⊢ℓ R. By Σ1-completeness, we find, in U0, that B is witnessed below m. ❑
Example 8.3. Let U be a variant of PRA in the arithmetical language. Then U
is a consistent restricted sequential theory. Let N0 be the identical interpretation.
Since, U is also reflexive, we can find an interpretationM such that M : U U and
U ⊢ IMU ⊥, for all definable N0-cuts I. It is obvious that we cannot have
U ⊢ (∃p ≤ m proofU (p,⊥))
M .
So, we do not have an analogue for Theorem 8.2, if we embed our existential sentence
in a self-interpretation M . Intuitively, viewed from the standpoint of the world of
U , the cuts definable inside M , seen from the outside, cannot be as small as the
cuts we have at the general level of the theory. ❍
We can escape the above example is we restrict ourselves to finitely axiomatized
theoriesA and restrictB to (Σ01)
N0-formulas. We then get the following internalized
form of Theorem 8.2:
Theorem 8.4. Consider a consistent finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and
let N0 : S
1
2  A. Consider any number n. Then, there is an N0-cut I, such that,
for any M : AA with ρ(M) ≤ n, and for any S ∈ Σ01, we have: if A ⊢ S
IM , then
S is true.
We lost the restriction on the complexity of the existentially quantified formula
from Theorem 8.2 by a small trick. The proof of this result can be found in [Vis93]
or [Vis05]. The essence of the trick in also given in the proof of Theorem 8.7 below.
We note that Theorem 8.4 contains both a restriction of the theory (it has
to be finitely axiomatized) and on the formula (it has to be (Σ01)
N0). One may
wonder it the restriction to finitely axiomatized theories suffices. (We have seen, in
Example 8.3, that the restriction to (Σ01)
N0 -sentences does not suffice.) Thus, we
are lead to the following conjecture.
Conjecture 8.5. Consider a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and let N0 :
S12A. Consider any number n. There is an N0-cut In such that, for any sentence
B := ∃x ∈ N B0(x) with ρ(B) ≤ n and any M : AA with ρ(M) ≤ n, we have:
(†) A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M ⇒ for some m we have A ⊢ (∃x ≤ mB0(x))
M .
Here the m is an N0-numeral.
We note that (†) is equivalent to:
(‡) A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M ⇒ for some m we have A ⊢
∨
k≤m
(B0(k))
M .
❍
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The conjecture could just turn out to be provable by a slightly more clever Rosser
argument than the ones I employed until now. My first attempts ran into the same
kind of problems as my attempts to prove the truth of Conjecture 3.13 directly:
somewhere a K on an undesired place. How to get rid of it?
There is an interesting equivalent of Conjecture 8.5.
Conjecture 8.6. Consider a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and let N0 :
S12  A. Consider any number n. There is an N0-cut Jn such that, for any Σ
0
1-
sentence S and for any sentence C with ρ(C) ≤ n and anyM : AAwith ρ(M) ≤ n,
we have: A ⊢ (SJn ∨ C)M ⇒ S is true, or A ⊢ CM . ❍
We note that, if we put ⊥ for C, then we get something that is known, to wit
Theorem 8.4.
Theorem 8.7. Conjectures 8.5 and 8.6 are equivalent.
Proof. Conjecture 8.5 implies Conjecture 8.6. Suppose we have Conjecture 8.5.
We remind the reader that S12 ⊢ x ∈ J1 → ∃y 2
x = y. It follows that S12 ⊢ S
J1 →
true(pSq), where true is the usual Σ01-truth predicate. See [HP93, Part C, Chapter
V, 5(b)] for a detailed treatment. We will write true(S) for true(pSq). We note
that ρ(true(S)) is a fixed standard number z independent of S. Let true(x) be
∃y true0(y, x), where true0 ∈ ∆0.
Let Jn := J1Imax(n,z+1). where In is provided by Conjecture 8.5. Consider any
C and K with complexities below n. Let n′ := max(n, z+ 1). We have:
A ⊢ (SJn ∨ C)M ⇒ A ⊢ (SJ1In′ ∨ C)M
⇒ A ⊢ (trueIn′ (S) ∨ C)M
⇒ A ⊢ (∃y ∈ In′ (true
N0
0 (y, S) ∨C))
M
⇒ for some m, A ⊢
∨
k≤m
(trueN00 (k, S) ∨C)
M
⇒ S is true or A ⊢ CM .
The last step uses that if ¬ true0(k, S) is true, then A ⊢ ¬ true
N0M
0 (k, S).
Conjecture 8.6 implies Conjecture 8.5. Suppose we have Conjecture 8.6. The
proof uses an idea from [Fri75]. Let n be given. Let n′ be n plus a constant for
overhead. We will be more specific about the choice of the constant later. Let
In := Jn′ . Suppose we have B and M , where ρ(B) and ρ(M) are ≤ n.
Suppose A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M . By the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, we find
R such that A ⊢ R ↔ B ≤ N0 RM . We note that the complexity of R is the
complexity of B plus a constant y that just depends on N0 and the arithmetization
of provability. So, traveling back in time, we take n′ := n + y. It is easy to see
that A ⊢ ( In RM ∨ R)M . It follows that RM is true or A ⊢ RM . So, A ⊢ RM .
Let m be the Go¨del number of a witness of A ⊢ RM . Then we find, that in
A ⊢ proofN0M (m,RM ). Combining this with A ⊢ RM , we find that, in A and
inside M , B is witnessed below m. ❑
In Appendix B, we formulate weaker versions of Conjecture 8.5 and Conjecture 8.6.
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8.3. Conjecture 8.5 implies Conjecture 3.13. We address the matter of defin-
ing Ky. Let A be finitely axiomatized, sequential and Enayat. Suppose N0 : AS
1
2
and K : A  (A + TB−N0). Let F := FN0,N0K be a definable isomorphism between
the cut C := CN0,N0K of the N0-numbers and its image in the N0K-numbers.
We define the function γ(y, x) as follows:
• γ(0, x) = x,
• γ(y + 1, x) := subst(pK(v0)q, num(γ(y, x))).
Here subst is the substitution function and num assigns to a number the
Go¨del number of its numeral.
Par abus de langage, we also write γ for the arithmetization of γ. The function
γ is defined on the logarithmic numbers of N0. Let N1 be a logarithmic cut, e.g.
N1 = J1N0. We define, for y ∈ δN1 ,
• KyD := (y = 0∧D)∨∃z < y (y = z+1∧∃u ∈ N0 (γ(z, pDq) = u∧K(u))).
Here is the main result of this section.
Theorem 8.8. The truth of Conjecture 8.5 implies the truth of Conjecture 3.13.
Proof. We assume the truth of Conjecture 8.5. Consider a finitely axiomatized,
sequential theory A. Suppose N0 : A  S
1
2 and K : A  (A + TB
−
N0
). We derive a
contradiction.
Let n∗ := max(2ρ(K), ρ(K(x))) + 2. We clearly may assume that In∗ is a log-
arithmic cut in N0, by shortening it when needed. We use the fixed point lemma
to obtain: A ⊢ L↔ K(∀w ∈ In∗¬K
wL). We note that ρ(L) ≤ n∗, since, generally,
ρ(K(s)) = ρ(K(x)) + 1.
We have: A+L ⊢ K¬L and hence A+L ⊢ ¬LK . So, A+L ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)KK .
Similarly, we have A+¬L ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)K . Let K˜ := KK〈L〉K. It follows that
K˜ : AA and A ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)K˜ . We note that ρ(K˜) = max(ρ(L), 2ρ(K))+ 1,
so ρ(K˜) ≤ n∗.
We apply Conjecture 8.5 to obtain, for some m: A ⊢ (
∨
k≤m K
kL)K˜ . Hence,
K + L ⊢
∨
k≤m
LK
k+2
and K + ¬L ⊢
∨
k≤m
LK
k+1
.
It follows that (‡) A ⊢
∨
k≤m+1 L
Kk+1 .
Since K : A  A, it follows that A ⊢ (
∨
k≤m+1 L
Kk+1)K
m+2
, and, hence, that
A ⊢
∨
k≤m+1 L
Km+k+3 . On the other hand, by the definition of L, and (‡), we find:
A ⊢
∧
k≤m+1 ¬L
Km+k+3 . So A is inconsistent. ❑
Remark 8.9. We note that the construction K˜ := KK〈L〉K preserves sentential
restrictedness. So, we need Conjecture 8.5 only for a very special kind of interpre-
tation —that does not even need to exist, given the fact that we are looking for a
reductio. ❍
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Appendix A. Vaught Set Theory continued
We give the proof of Theorem 2.1, i.e., we show that VS dir VS
+ via a one-
dimensional interpretation.
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Proof. We define PC0 as the virtual class of all x such that
8
1. x ∼ x
2. ∀y ∀z ((x ∼ y ∧ x ∼ z)→ y ∼ z)
3. ∀y ∀z (x ∼ y ∼ z → x ∼ y)
Suppose x is in PC0 and x ∼ y. We show y ∈ PC0.
Ad (1) We have x ∼ y ∧ x ∼ y. Hence, by (2) for x, y ∼ y.
Ad (2) Suppose y ∼ z and y ∼ u. it follows that x ∼ y ∼ z and x ∼ y ∼ u. Hence,
by (3) for x, we find x ∼ z and x ∼ u. Ergo, by (2), z ∼ u.
Ad (3) Suppose y ∼ z ∼ u. it follows that x ∼ y ∼ z, hence, by (3) for x, we find
x ∼ z. It follows that x ∼ z ∼ u, hence, by (3) for x, we find x ∼ u. So we
have x ∼ y and x ∼ u, so, by (2) for x, we have y ∼ u.
The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on PC0. The only thing to check is
symmetry. Consider x ∈ PC0 and suppose x ∼ y. We have x ∼ y ∧ x ∼ x and, so,
by (2), y ∼ x.
We define PC1 as the class of x in PC0 such that
∀u ∀v ∀f ((x ∼ u ∼ v ∧ f : u ∼ v)→ u ∼ f).
We note that ∼ is an equivalence relation on PC1.
We show that PC1 is closed under ∼. Suppose PC1(x) and x ∼ y and y ∼ u ∼ v
and f : u ∼ v. Then, since PC0(x), we have x ∼ u ∼ v and f : u ∼ v. So, we may
conclude u ∼ f .
Finally, if PC1(x) and f : x ∼ y, then x ∼ x ∼ y and f : x ∼ y, and, so x ∼ f ,
and, hence PC1(f).
We now define u ∈+ v iff u ∈ v ∧ PC1(v). We claim that we have VS
+ for ∈+.
We note that, whenever x is in PC1, it defines the same set for ∈ and for ∈
+. Also,
any non-empty ∈+-set x will be in PC1.
Clearly, any ∈-finite set will be in PC1. Thus, it will have the same ∈
+-elements.
In other words, finite sets are absolute with respect to our interpretation. It follows
that we have the VS-axioms for ∈+.
Since, Kuratowski pairs are constructed using finite sets, we easily see that Ku-
ratowski pairs are absolute too. It follows that, whenever, f is an ∈-function that
is in PC1, then f is also ∈
+-function with the same input-output behavior.
Let u ∼+ v be defined like ∼ with ∈ replaced by ∈+. We claim (†) for x in PC1,
we have x ∼ y iff x ∼+ y. First suppose f : x ∼ y. Clearly, f and y will be in PC1,
hence f : x ∼+ y. Conversely, suppose g : x ∼+ y. In case x is ∈+-empty, x will be
∈-empty, since x ∈ PC1. Hence, x : x ∼ y. In case, x is ∈
+-non-empty, also y and
g will be ∈+-non-empty. Hence, they are in PC1. It follows that g : x ∼ y.
Consider any x. In case x is ∈+-empty, we have x : x ∼+ x. In case x is
∈+-non-empty, it is in PC1, hence x ∼ x, and, so, by (†), x ∼
+ x.
Consider any x and y with x ∼+ y. In case x is ∈+-empty, we have x : y ∼+ x.
Suppose x is ∈+-non-empty. Then, x is in PC1. It follows, by (†), that x ∼ y, and
hence, that y is in PC1 and y ∼ x. Hence, by (†), y ∼
+ x.
Suppose x ∼+ y ∼+ z. If x is ∈+-empty, y will be ∈+-empty and so will be z.
Hence, x : x ∼+ z. Suppose x is ∈+-non-empty. It follows that x is in PC1. Hence,
by (†), x ∼ y, y is in PC1 and y ∼ z. So x ∼ z. Again by (†), x ∼
+ z.
8‘PC’ stands for pre-cardinals.
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Finally, suppose f : x ∼+ y. In case x is ∈+-empty, we find that f is ∈+-empty,
and, hence, x : x ∼+ f . Suppose x is ∈+-non-empty, then so are y and f . Then x,
y and f are in PC1, and, hence, f : x ∼ y. It follows that x ∼ f and, hence, by (†),
that x ∼+ f . ❑
Our next order of business is to prove Theorem 2.2, to wit that VS R via a one-
dimensional interpretation. There are two possible proofs. I will give (a sketch of)
both.
First proof: By Theorem 2.1 it suffices to prove that VS+R. The basic idea of our
interpretation is to give the usual cardinal definitions of the arithmetical operations
whenever they work. When they do not work we set them to a default value.
We write pair(x, y, z) for: z represents a Kuratowski pair with first component
x and second component y.
We call our translation ρ. We define:
• δρ(x) := (x = x),
• x =ρ y := x ∼ y,
• Zρ(x) := ∀y y 6∈ x,
• adj(x, y, z) := ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u = y)),
• S0(x, y) := ∃z (z 6∈ x ∧ adj(x, z, y)),
• S1(x, y) := ∃u ∃v (S0(u, v) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ v ∼ y),
• S2(x, y) := S1(x, y) ∧ ∀z (S1(x, z)→ y ∼ z),
• Sρ(x, y) := S2(x, y) ∨ (∀z ¬S2(x, z) ∧ x ∼ y),
• U(x, y, z) := ∀u (u ∈ z ↔ (u ∈ x ∨ u ∈ y)),
• A0(x, y, z) := ∀u¬ (u ∈ x ∧ u ∈ y) ∧ U(x, y, z),
• A1(x, y, z) := ∃u ∃v ∃w (A0(u, v, w) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ y ∼ v ∧ z ∼ w),
• A2(x, y, z) := A1(x, y, z) ∧ ∀u (A1(x, y, u)→ z ∼ u),
• Aρ(x, y, z) := A2(x, y, z) ∨ (∀u¬A2(x, y, u) ∧ z ∼ y),
• M0(x, y, z) :=
∀u ∈ x∀v ∈ y ∃w ∈ z pair(u, v, w) ∧
∀w ∈ z ∃u ∈ x∃v ∈ y pair(u, v, w) ∧
∀p ∈ z ∀q ∈ z ∀u ∈ x∀v ∈ y ((pair(u, v, p) ∧ pair(u, v, q))→ p = q),
• M1(x, y, z) := ∃u ∃v ∃w (M0(u, v, w) ∧ x ∼ u ∧ y ∼ v ∧ z ∼ w),
• M2(x, y, z) := M1(x, y, z) ∧ ∀u (M1(x, y, u)→ z ∼ u),
• Mρ(x, y, z) := M2(x, y, z) ∨ (∀u¬M2(x, y, u) ∧ z ∼ y),
It is clear that on the standardly finite sets our operations behave as the ordinary
successor, sum and product. Moreover, ≤ defined as x ≤ y := ∃z (z + x = y)
behaves as usual. Thus, ρ carries an interpretation of R. ❑
Remark A.1. We note that we could manipulate the interpretation of ∈ further
in order to interpret principles like:
• ∀x∀y ∀z ∀u ∀v ((x ∼ y ∧ u 6∈ x ∧ v 6∈ y ∧ adj(x, u, z))→ ∃w adj(y, v, w)).
Clearly, in the presence of such principles, we can build an interpretation following
the above strategy that is simpler. ❍
Second proof. We interpret the theory of a category in VS. We define Ob as the
class of x such that ∃i : x→ x ∀y ∈ x i(y) = y and
∀y ∀z ∀f : x→ y ∀g : y → z ∃h : x→ z ∀u ∈ x f(g(u)) = h(u).
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We defineMorph as the functions between the elements of Ob and we take as identity
on Morph extensional sameness. We define identity arrows and composition in the
obvious way. It is easy to see Ob and Morph with the chosen operations define a
category in VS and that the standardly finite sets are in Ob.
We now define sum(x, y, z) and prod(x, y, z) as the category-theoretical sum and
product. We note that these are partial operations but have verifiably good prop-
erties like commutativity and associativity.
Finally we define our interpretation, say ν, of R by taking:
• δν := Ob,
• =ν is isomorphism in our category,
• Zν(x) := ∀y y 6∈ x,
• Aν(x, y, z) := sum(x, y, z) ∨ (∀w ¬ sum(x, y, w) ∧ z =ν y),
• sing(x) := ∃y ∀z (z ∈ x↔ z = y),
• Sν(x, y) := ∃z (sing(z) ∧ Aν(x, z, y)),
• Mν(x, y, z) := prod(x, y, z) ∨ (∀w ¬ prod(x, y, w) ∧ z =ν y).
The rest of the proof is as expected. ❑
Appendix B. Internal SIVS revisited
We have a weaker version of the conjectured internal Small-is-very-small Princi-
ple Conjecture 8.5. This version is suggested by attempts to prove Conjecture 8.5.
It looks like this. Let A be finitely axiomatized and sequential and let N0 : A S
1
2.
Conjecture B.1. Let n be given. Then, there is an N0-cut In, such that, for
every sentence B := ∃x ∈ N0B0(x) with ρ(B) ≤ n, and, for every M : AA with
ρ(M) ≤ n, we have:
A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M ⇒ there are m and k such that A ⊢
∨
i≤m
∨
0<j≤k
(B0(i))
Mj .
Here M j means the j-fold iteration of M . ❍
Our conjecture also has an equivalent variant (analogous to Conjecture 8.6):
Conjecture B.2. Consider any n. Then, there is an N0-cut Jn, such that for all
S ∈ Σ01 and for all C with ρ(C) ≤ n and for all M : AA with ρ(M) ≤ n we have:
if A ⊢ (SJn ∨C)M , then, for some k, we have S is true or A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k C
Mj . ❍
Theorem B.3. Conjectures B.1 and Conjecture B.2 are equivalent.
The proof is analogous to the proof of the equivalence of Conjectures 8.5 and 8.6.
The aim of the proof sketch below is mainly to highlight the differences.
Proof. Conjecture B.1 implies Conjecture B.2. Suppose we have Conjecture B.1.
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Let Jn := J1Imax(n,z+1). where In is provided by Conjecture B.1. Consider any
C and K with complexities below n. Let n′ := max(n, z+ 1). We have:
A ⊢ (SJn ∨ C)M ⇒ A ⊢ (SJ1In′ ∨ C)M
⇒ A ⊢ (trueIn′ (S) ∨C)M
⇒ A ⊢ (∃y ∈ In′ (true
N0
0 (y, S) ∨C))
M
⇒ for some m and k, A ⊢
∨
i≤m
∨
0<j≤k
(trueN00 (i, S) ∨C)
Mj
⇒ S is true or A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k
CM
j
.
Conjecture B.2 implies Conjecture B.1. Suppose we have Conjecture B.2. Let n be
given. Let n′ be n+ y and let In := Jn′ . Suppose we have B and M , where ρ(B)
and ρ(M) are ≤ n.
Suppose A ⊢ (∃x ∈ In B0(x))
M . We write:
∨
j
D0<j := ∃p ∃y ≤ |p| proof(p,
∨
0<i≤y
Di).
Here |p| is the entier of the 2-logarithm of p. By the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma,
we find R with A ⊢ R↔ B ≤ N0
∨
0<j R
Mj .
It is easy to see that A ⊢ ( In
∨
0<j R
Mj ∨ R)M . It follows that
∨
0<j R
Mj
is true or, for some k, we have A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k R
Mj . So, for some k, we have A ⊢∨
0<j≤k R
Mj . Let m be the Go¨del number of a witness of A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k R
Mj . Then,
A ⊢ proofN0M (m,
∨
0<j≤k R
Mj ). Combining this with A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k R
Mj , we find
the desired result. ❑
Here is the analogue of Theorem 8.8.
Theorem B.4. The truth of Conjecture B.1 implies the truth of Conjecture 3.13.
The proof is just a trivial variant of the proof of Theorem 8.8.
Proof. We assume the truth of Conjecture B.1. Consider a finitely axiomatized,
sequential theory A. Suppose N0 : A  S
1
2 and K : A  (A + TB
−
N0
). We derive a
contradiction.
Let n∗ := max(2ρ(K), ρ(K(x))) + 2. We clearly may assume that In∗ is a log-
arithmic cut in N0, by shortening it when needed. We use the fixed point lemma
to obtain: A ⊢ L↔ K(∀w ∈ In∗¬K
wL). We note that ρ(L) ≤ n∗, since, generally,
ρ(K(s)) = ρ(K(x)) + 1.
We have: A+L ⊢ K¬L and hence A+L ⊢ ¬LK . So, A+L ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)KK .
Similarly, we have A+¬L ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)K . Let K˜ := KK〈L〉K. It follows that
K˜ : AA and A ⊢ (∃w ∈ In∗ K
wL)K˜ . We note that ρ(K˜) = max(ρ(L), 2ρ(K))+ 1,
so ρ(K˜) ≤ n∗.
We apply Conjecture B.1 to obtain,
for some m and k: A ⊢ (
∨
i≤m
∨
0<j≤k
KiL)K˜
j
.
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Hence,
K + L ⊢
∨
j≤m+k
LK
j+2
and K + ¬L ⊢
∨
j≤m+k
LK
j+1
.
It follows that (‡) A ⊢
∨
j≤m+k+1 L
Kj+1 .
Since K : A  A, it follows that A ⊢ (
∨
j≤m+1 L
Kj+1)K
m+k+2
, and, hence, that
A ⊢
∨
j≤m+1 L
Km+k+j+3 . On the other hand, by the definition of L, and (‡), we
find: A ⊢
∧
j≤m+k+1 ¬L
Km+k+j+3 . So A is inconsistent. ❑
Appendix C. Conjectures and questions
C.1. Conjectures.
c1. No finitely axiomatized consistent Vaught theory is Enayat. (Conjecture 3.7.) Equiv-
alently, we have the following conjecture. Suppose U is a consistent Vaught theory.
Then T(U) is not quasi-finite. (Conjecture 3.18.)
If this conjecture fails, we conjecture that no finitely axiomatized consistent se-
quential theory is Enayat. (Conjecture 3.13.)
c2. Suppose A is finitely axiomatized and consistent and sequential. Let N : S12  A.
Then, there is no extension of S12 that is mutually interpretable with A+TB
−
N . (Con-
jecture 3.17.)
It is a well known open question whether every sequential theory is mutually in-
terpretable with an extension-in-the-same-language of S12. Our conjecture provides a
possible example to illustrate a negative answer to this question.
c3. Let U be Vaught. and let N : R  U . Suppose α ◮U TB
−
N . Then, α ◮U USB
−
N .
(Conjecture 6.5.)
c4. Suppose A is a finitely axiomatized Vaught in signature Θ0. Let N : A R. Suppose
further that ⊤A TB
−
N . Then, there is a β such that ⊤A β ◮A TB
−
N .
More generally, we may conjecture the following. Suppose A is a finitely axiom-
atized Vaught theory and ⊤ A V . Then, there is a B such that ⊤ A B ◮A V .
(Conjecture 6.9.)
c5. Consider a finitely axiomatized sequential theory A and let N0 : S
1
2  A. Consider
any number n. There is an N0-cut In such that, for any sentence B := ∃x ∈ N B0(x)
with ρ(B) ≤ n and any M : AA with ρ(M) ≤ n, we have:
(†) A ⊢ (∃x ∈ In B0(x))
M
⇒ for some m we have A ⊢ (∃x ≤ mB0(x))
M
.
Here the m is an N0-numeral.
We note that (†) is equivalent to:
(‡) A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M
⇒ for some m we have A ⊢
∨
k≤m
(B0(k))
M
.
(Conjecture 8.5.)
There is an interesting equivalent of Conjecture 8.5. Consider a finitely axiomatized
sequential theory A and let N0 : S
1
2 A. Consider any number n. There is an N0-cut
Jn such that, for any Σ
0
1-sentence S and for any sentence C with ρ(C) ≤ n and any
M : A A with ρ(M) ≤ n, we have: A ⊢ (SJn ∨ C)M ⇒ S is true, or A ⊢ CM .
(Conjecture 8.6.)
c6. Let n be given. Then, there is an N0-cut In, such that, for every sentence B := ∃x ∈
N0 B0(x) with ρ(B) ≤ n, and, for every M : A A with ρ(A) ≤ n, we have:
A ⊢ (∃x ∈ InB0(x))
M ⇒ there are m and k such that A ⊢
∨
i≤m
∨
0<j≤k
(B0(i))
Mj
.
Here M j means the j-fold iteration of M . (Conjecture B.1.)
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An equivalent conjecture runs as follows. Consider any n. Then, there is an N0-
cut Jn, such that for all S ∈ Σ
0
1 and for all C with ρ(C) ≤ n and for all M : A  A
with ρ(M) ≤ n we have: if A ⊢ (SJn ∨ C)M , then, for some k, we have S is true or
A ⊢
∨
0<j≤k
CM
j
. (Conjecture B.2)
C.2. Questions.
q1. Suppose there is a finitely axiomatized, consistent Vaught theory that is Enayat. Can
we show, under that assumption, that all finitely axiomatized, consistent, Vaught
theories are Enayat theories? (Question 3.8.)
q2. In Subsection 3.4, we have shown that in the recursively enumerable sequential case,
we can characterize Enayat theories in a coordinate-free way. Not only is the question
of Enayatness independent of the Go¨del numbering, but Go¨del numberings are not
mentioned in the characterization. Can we do something similar in the Vaught case?
(Question 3.9.)
q3. Are there any interesting relations between theories, besides mutual interpretability,
that preserve Enayatness? (Question 3.16.)
q4. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A with the N-Enayat property for
some N : Succ0A, when we demand that the Go¨del numbering is p-time computable?
(Question 4.1.)
q5. Is there an example of a finitely axiomatized theory A such that we have the Enayat
property for all N : Succ0  A? (Question 4.2.)
q6. Does TB−N have a restricted axiomatization over U? (Question 5.7.)
q7. Can we show that, for no consistent sequential U , we have TB−N ◮U USB
−
N? (Ques-
tion 5.10.)
q8. Can we prove the non-existence of a finitely axiomatized consistent sequential uniform
Enayat theory without a detour over the second incompleteness theorem? (Ques-
tion 5.14.)
q9. Is there a finitely axiomatized Vaught theory that is uniformly Enayat? Here unifor-
mity is explicated using USB−. (Question 5.15.)
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